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K E N N E D Y ’S LAST TERM
Marc O. DeGirolami and Kevin C. Walsh 
report on the 2017-2018 Supreme Court.
TIII wenty-eighteen brought the
| |  end of Justice Anthony
Kennedy’s tenure on the 
Supreme Court. We are now entering a period of uncertainty about 
American constitutional law. Will we remain on the trajectory of the last 
half-century? Or will the Court move in a different direction?
The character of the Supreme Court in closely divided cases is often 
a function of the median justice. The new median justice will be Chief 
Justice John Roberts if Kennedy’s replacement is a conservative likely 
to vote most often with Justices Clarence Thomas, Neil Gorsuch, and 
Samuel Alito. This will mark a new phase of the Roberts Court.
Marc O. DeGirolami is professor of law and associate director of the Center for Law and Religion 
at St. John’s University. Kevin C. Walsh is professor of law at the University of Richmond.
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Yet the composition of the Court is not the only 
important variable. The Court has been influenced— 
heavily influenced, in some areas—by elite cultural 
opinion as well. Where such influence has degraded 
the foundations of constitutional law, a new justice, 
no matter what his views, can only make a limited 
difference.
Before offering some conjectures about the post- 
Kennedy Court, though, we look back at some of the 
signature cases of this past term.
T
he term was significant for the First 
Amendment. It was important for what 
the Court said and what it did not say. 
It highlighted disagreement between 
the conservative and progressive wings 
of the Court about the nature, scope, and value of 
freedom of speech, a disagreement likely to intensify 
in future years.
Two First Amendment cases in particular il­
lustrated a broader asymmetry in much culture 
war litigation. Social progressives use the courts 
to secure and extend cultural gains, while social 
conservatives repair to the courts to obtain reprieves 
from further cultural losses. Perhaps unsurprisingly, 
the two cases involved same-sex marriage and abor­
tion, respectively. Social conservatives won in both 
cases, but their victories are tenuous, and they were 
forced to litigate in the first place only because they 
had lost unequivocally in the legislative and admin­
istrative realms.
Both cases involved legal penalties imposed on 
Christians for what state legislators or officials 
openly condemned as retrograde and benighted 
views. Masterpiece Cakeshop v. Colorado Civil 
Rights Commission concerned a challenge to a state 
civil rights commission’s ruling that Jack Phillips, a 
Christian baker, violated Colorado’s antidiscrimina­
tion laws when he declined to create a custom cake 
in celebration of a same-sex marriage. In a 7-2 de­
cision authored by Justice Kennedy, the Court held 
that the commission violated the free exercise clause 
because one commissioner openly denigrated Phil­
lips’s Christian view of marriage, calling it “despi­
cable” and comparing it to defenses of slavery and 
the Holocaust. A second commissioner indicated that 
religious beliefs like Phillips’s cannot be “carried into 
the public sphere or commercial domain.” But the 
seven-justice majority’s zone of agreement was nar­
row, depending especially on the first commissioner’s 
imprudent on-the-record vituperation. The crucial 
decision about how to resolve the tensions in a case 
not involving explicit hostility toward traditional 
Christian views was thus postponed.
The dueling concurrences of Justice Elena Kagan 
(joined by Justice Stephen Breyer) and Justice 
Gorsuch (joined by Justice Alito) demonstrate the 
deeper conflict within the Court about the future of 
the First Amendment in these cases. The core of their 
disagreement concerned evidence that customers who 
approached other bakers to make cakes with mes­
sages expressing disapproval of same-sex marriage 
were refused by those bakers. Yet when those cus­
tomers sued the bakers for religious discrimination, 
the bakers prevailed before the Colorado Civil Rights 
Commission. Meanwhile, Phillips, who would not 
make a cake approving of same-sex marriage, lost 
before the commission.
Justice Kagan argued that this discrepancy was 
immaterial. These pro-same-sex-marriage bakers, 
unlike Phillips, were not engaged in the relevant kind 
of discrimination against “individuals based on . . . 
sexual orientation and creed,” because they would 
not have made the requested cake for any customer. 
They were neutral with respect to customers. When 
it comes to sexual orientation, the Court has treated 
conduct as inextricably connected with identity and 
thus deserving of protection. But for religion, Kagan 
felt that a different rule should apply: “A vendor can 
choose the products he sells, but not the customers 
he serves—no matter the reason.” A refusal to sell a 
wedding cake to couples of the same sex, she flatly 
declared, “has nothing to do with Phillips’ religious 
beliefs.”
Justice Gorsuch disagreed: “It was the kind of 
cake, not the kind of customer, that mattered.” 
Phillips would not have made a cake celebrating a 
same-sex marriage for any customer, gay or straight, 
just as the other bakers would not have made a cake 
disapproving a same-sex marriage under any circum­
stances. And yet, argued Gorsuch, the civil rights 
commission applied one standard for Phillips and 
another for the other bakers. Thus do we get an in­
kling of where the battle will be waged in future cases 
involving similar conflicts between First Amendment 
freedoms and state antidiscrimination laws.
I
n National Institute o f Family and Life Advo­
cates v. Becerra, the Court reviewed a challenge 
to California regulations imposed on pro-life 
pregnancy resource centers. One required state- 
licensed centers to advertise the availability of 
state-subsidized abortions, while a second required 
unlicensed centers to notify women prominently 
and in several languages that they were not licensed. 
(In Los Angeles, thirteen different translations were 
necessary.) The law manifested an intent to ta r­
get “largely Christian belief-based” centers, which
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California state legislators believed were not suffi­
ciently “forward thinking” about abortion, as re­
corded in the statute’s legislative history.
In a 5 -4  opinion, Justice Clarence Thomas held 
that the statute violated the freedom of speech. Its 
provisions compelled the centers to express content- 
specific messages, including about obtaining the very 
service to which the centers objected: abortion. The 
Court emphatically rejected the claim that “profes­
sional speech” is a distinctive category that may be 
regulated more extensively than others. And it also 
relied on the difference between speech and conduct 
in distinguishing cases like Planned Parenthood v. 
Casey, which held that abortion providers could be 
required by the state, over their free speech objec­
tions, to obtain informed consent before performing 
an abortion. Those cases, Thomas argued, did not 
apply because the pro-life centers in N1FLA were 
not performing abortions. He noted that California 
had selectively exempted general practice medical fa­
cilities from the same requirements that it imposed 
on the pro-life centers, suggesting that the state of 
California had an illegitimate interest in compelling 
precisely these facilities to advertise state-sponsored 
abortion. Justice Kennedy’s concurrence, joined by 
Justice Gorsuch, argued that the regulations were 
intended to squelch the pro-life views of the centers: 
“It is not forward thinking to force individuals to ‘be 
an instrument for fostering public adherence to an 
ideological point of view [they] fin[d] unacceptable.’” 
Justice Stephen Breyer dissented, joined by Justices 
Kagan, Ruth Bader Ginsburg, and Sonia Sotomayor. 
If a state may require an abortion provider to tell a 
woman seeking an abortion about adoption services 
(as the Court had held in Casey), Breyer argued, it 
should also be able to require pro-life centers to tell 
a woman about the availability of state-subsidized 
abortion. The dissent went further, charging that the 
majority had empowered pro-life centers “to use the 
Constitution as a weapon” to defeat “reasonable” 
“economic and social laws.” It would not be the last 
time this term that these justices would employ the 
metaphor of constitutional weaponization as to the 
freedom of speech.
P
erhaps the most controversial First Amend­
ment case of the term was Janus v. Ameri­
can Federation o f State, County, and 
Municipal Employees, in which the Court 
struck down an Illinois law that compelled 
nonmembers to pay public-sector union fees. The 
Court reversed Abood v. Detroit Board o f Education, 
the late 1970s decision that held compulsory public- 
sector agency fees were constitutional, so long as the
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money was used only for activities “germane” to 
collective bargaining rather than for what the Court 
then described as separate “political and ideological 
projects.” In an opinion for the Court authored by 
Justice Alito on behalf of the same five-justice major­
ity as in NIFLA,  the Court held that these compul­
sory union fees violated the freedom of speech. Such 
fees forced support (in the form of financial subsidies) 
for messages with which the litigants disagreed, and 
Abood’s distinction between permissible and imper­
missible expenditures had proved easier to articulate 
than apply. “It is impossible to argue,” the majority 
opinion contended, “that the level o f . . .  state spend­
ing for employee benefits . . .  is not a matter of great 
public concern.”
As in Justice Breyer’s NIFLA  dissent, Justice 
Kagan’s acid Janus dissent accused the majority 
of “weaponizing” the freedom of speech. Kagan 
denounced the justices in the majority as “black- 
robed rulers overruling citizen choices” and cen­
sured them for “turning the First Amendment into 
a sword” with which to smite democracy. “The First 
Amendment,” she lectured, “was meant for better 
things. It was meant not to undermine but to protect 
democratic governance.”
One might have thought that the function of con­
stitutional rights was precisely to protect against 
certain democratic choices, even those not involving 
the sexual mores and secular proclivities of the elite 
classes. Janus, at least, involved a freedom with a firm 
textual anchor in the Constitution, rather than one 
invented by the Court in response to the felt impera­
tives of the forward cultural march. But the weap­
onization metaphor was minted about five years ago 
to attack religious freedom, when the Hobby Lobby 
case evoked so much outrage. It is sobering to see 
four justices now deploying it against the freedom 
of speech.
Notwithstanding the rhetorical warfare of the 
NIFLA and Janus dissenters, both of these decisions 
do showcase the Court’s increasing embrace of a 
robustly libertarian conception of the First Amend­
ment—one which has been ascendant for at least a 
half century. Yet if the libertarian freedom of speech 
is now serving conservative ends, one should remem­
ber that for decades it promoted socially progres­
sive ends in the Court’s cases involving defamation, 
obscenity, sexually explicit speech, and many other 
twentieth-century expansions of free speech. Liber­
tarian freedom of speech can support very different 
ideological projects.
Indeed, First Amendment doctrine from the late 
1960s through the early 1980s was largely function­
alist, involving unabashed policy judgments and the
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crude balancing of competing political and economic 
considerations. Over the past few decades, by con­
trast, the Court’s preferred approach has become 
more formalist, turning on categories and rule-based 
doctrinal formulations. The Roberts Court’s over­
ruling of Abood in Janus can thus be understood as 
what Villanova law professor Michael Moreland has 
aptly called the end of the free speech disco era.
Much of the disagreement between Justice Alito’s 
majority opinion and Justice Kagan’s dissent in Janus 
concerned the force of stare decisis—the principle 
that precedent should be followed even if erroneous, 
absent overriding justification. This conflict recurred 
in other cases, and it will again as the personnel of 
the Court continues to change. As more conserva­
tive judges join the Court, one should expect louder 
appeals by the Court’s left wing for adherence to 
stare decisis in an attempt to preserve and entrench 
past gains. The more conservative judges, unhappy 
with the trajectory of recent decades, will continue 
to press for distinguishing, narrowing, or overrul­
ing what they regard as the Court’s many wrong 
doctrinal turns.
N
ot all of the 1970s is destined to go 
up in flames, however. In another 
closely watched case, the more con­
servative justices relied heavily on a 
decision from the 1970s to douse a 
First Amendment conflagration. Trump v. Hawaii 
concerned President Donald Trump’s executive or­
der stopping immigration from eight countries (later 
reduced to five, and with some exceptions from the 
listed countries). The third version of the so-called 
“Muslim travel ban” earned the sobriquet because of 
controversial statements made by President Trump, 
including some from before he was elected.
The constitutional objection to President Trump’s 
order was that it discriminated against Muslims in 
violation of the First Amendment’s establishment 
clause. Writing for a bare majority, Chief Justice 
Roberts argued that Kleindienst v. Mandel (1972) 
easily disposed of the case because it limits judicial 
oversight of visa denials to any “facially legitimate 
and bona fide” reason the president might offer. That 
meant no in-depth examination of all of President 
Trump’s utterances on the topic. Roberts actually 
scrutinized a little more than Kleindienst had en­
visioned, looking underneath the face of the order 
for a “rational basis” for it. But rational basis review 
is very circumscribed, and Roberts emphasized the 
limits of the Court’s power as respects a function al­
located to the executive branch within broad bound­
aries set by Congress.
The four dissenting justices split. Justice Breyer, 
joined by Justice Kagan, wrote a narrow, techni­
cal, cold opinion that reads like an unsuccessful 
attempt to peel off a justice from the majority. Jus­
tice Sotomayor authored the other dissent, joined 
by Justice Ginsburg. This more full-blooded dis­
sent distinguished Kleindienst as inapplicable and 
invoked Korematsu v. United States, the notorious 
World War II-era case upholding the detention of 
American citizens of Japanese descent in internment 
camps. “By blindly accepting the Government’s 
misguided invitation to sanction a discriminatory 
policy motivated by animus, all in the name of a 
superficial claim of national security,” Sotomayor 
charged, “the Court redeploys the same dangerous 
logic underlying Korematsu.'” Responding for the 
majority, Roberts contended that Korematsu was 
“wholly inapt.” “The forcible relocation of U.S. citi­
zens to concentration camps, solely and explicitly on 
the basis of race,” Roberts wrote, “is objectively un­
lawful and outside the scope of presidential author­
ity.” Korematsu was entirely unlike the “facially 
neutral policy denying certain foreign nationals the 
privilege of admission.”
A
longside these significant First Amend­
ment developments ran a second, less 
noticed theme: the influence of social, 
technological, and moral change on Su­
preme Court doctrine.
In South Dakota v. Wayfair, Inc., for example, the 
growth of Internet commerce prompted an unusual 
five-justice coalition finally to abandon a 1967 deci­
sion, National Bellas Hess. Inc. v. Department o f 
Revenue o f Illinois, that prevented states from tax­
ing sales made by out-of-state merchants to in-state 
residents. Doctrinal change in related areas and the 
growth of mail-order businesses between 1967 and 
1992 had prompted one state supreme court to opine 
that “tremendous social, economic, commercial, and 
legal innovations” of the intervening quarter century 
had rendered National Bellas Hess obsolete. But in 
1992, eight justices—including Justice Kennedy and 
Justice Thomas—disagreed and reaffirmed it. This 
year, Kennedy and Thomas changed their minds, and 
Justices Ginsburg, Alito, and Gorsuch joined them 
in reversing course. Not only was the 1992 refusal 
to overrule National Bellas Hess “wrong on its own 
terms,” wrote Kennedy in an opinion for the Court, 
but “since then the Internet revolution has made its 
earlier error all the more egregious and harmful.” 
Chief Justice Roberts dissented, joined by Justices 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan. These justices agreed 
that the precedents were wrong but believed that stare
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decisis called for leaving them in place. Congress, they 
argued, not the Court, should address the problem.
Another variation on the theme of social change 
influencing doctrinal change appeared in a very sig­
nificant Fourth Amendment decision, Carpenter v. 
United States. But this time Chief Justice Roberts 
was in the majority, while Justices Kennedy, Thomas, 
Alito, and Gorsuch dissented. The case concerned 
the “third-party doctrine,” which provides that an 
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy 
giving rise to Fourth Amendment protection in infor­
mation handed over to third parties. The Court has 
previously held, for instance, that individuals have no 
Fourth Amendment privacy expectation in their bank 
records because those are maintained by the bank, a 
third party; same for the telephone numbers one calls 
because those are transmitted to the phone company.
The question in Carpenter was whether the third- 
party doctrine permitted the government to obtain 
data about a person’s location from wireless company 
cell towers without first securing a warrant. Law en­
forcement officials had tracked a robbery suspect, 
Timothy Carpenter, after getting this kind of infor­
mation from a wireless carrier using a special kind 
of order that did not require the same showing of 
suspicion needed for a warrant. The information thus 
procured was “12,898 location points cataloging 
Carpenter’s movements over 127 days—an average 
of 101 data points per day.” Motivated perhaps by a 
concern about how deeply intertwined our personal 
lives have become with digital devices, Chief Justice 
Roberts held that the third-party doctrine did not 
authorize the government to obtain this information 
without a search warrant. He was joined by Justices 
Breyer, Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan. The ma­
jority insisted that it was not rejecting the third-party 
doctrine more broadly. But lower courts will have to 
figure out whether and how Carpenter’s reasoning 
applies to other kinds of information we regularly 
produce in the digital world.
While Carpenter illustrates that technological 
change may narrow precedent, Murphy v. NCAA  
shows that social and moral change may entrench 
and extend it. Congress enacted the Professional and 
Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA) in the early 
1990s to prevent the spread of sports gambling be­
yond Nevada and a handful of other states. When 
passed, the act gave New Jersey—home to Atlantic 
City’s many casinos—one year to decide whether to 
allow sports gambling. The state did not authorize 
sports gambling by the deadline. A couple decades 
later, however, New Jersey voters changed their 
mind, but the NCAA and professional sports leagues
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went to court to stop New Jersey and enforce PASPA’s 
prohibition. Here things get a little tricky. PASPA 
does not make sports gambling a federal crime. But 
it does prohibit New Jersey from repealing its own 
prohibition of sports gambling. By a 7-2 vote, the Su­
preme Court held that the federal government could 
not handcuff the states in this manner.
Murphy extends and solidifies the Court’s “anti­
commandeering” doctrine. In an earlier case, the Su­
preme Court held that Congress could not directly 
order states to pass particular laws. This kind of 
national takeover of state legislative processes, the 
Court said, is undemocratic because it enables both 
Congress and the states to evade popular account­
ability. Each can blame the other for the resulting 
state of the law. Writing for the Court in Murphy, 
Justice Alito reasoned that there was no real differ­
ence between ordering states to enact laws and pro­
hibiting them from repealing laws. Although earlier 
anti-commandeering cases had been viewed as vul­
nerable “states’ rights” cases because of the narrow 
and ideologically inflected majorities by which they 
had been decided, the fact that Justices Breyer and 
Kagan joined Alito’s opinion for the Court shows 
that anti-commandeering doctrine is here to stay.
The social, economic, and moral impact of Mur­
phy is likely to be substantial. Since the decision was 
handed down, a number of states have moved to le­
galize sports gambling. Social conservatives may re­
gret this outcome; indeed, the decision will probably 
be most damaging to those least capable of coping 
with the vice of gambling. But from another point 
of view, a strong anti-commandeering doctrine ob­
structs social engineers from fobbing off responsibil­
ity for objectionable policies.
T
wo cases involving the constitutionality 
of partisan gerrymandering brought the 
relationship among cultural change, per­
sonnel change, and doctrinal change to­
gether with another leitmotif of the term: 
the limits of judicial power.
Current constitutional doctrine for drawing vot­
ing district lines requires that districts must contain 
roughly equal numbers of people and that racial con­
siderations may not predominate. The question posed 
by partisan gerrymandering claims is whether there is 
a third rule that partisan political considerations may 
not play an excessive role in district drawing. Since 
first holding in 1986 that intentional disadvantag­
ing of the voters of one party presents a justiciable 
partisan gerrymandering claim, the Supreme Court 
has failed for more than thirty years to articulate
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administrable standards for evaluating these claims. 
In 2004, four justices argued that such claims were 
nonjusticiable because there was no plausible stan­
dard for deciding how much politics was too much. 
The lower courts, wrote Justice Antonin Scalia, 
had been “wandering in the wilderness for eighteen 
years.” But the other five justices, including Justice 
Kennedy, wanted to keep trying.
And so the lower courts have continued to wander, 
while the academic constitutional clerisy has devel­
oped a profusion of theories that address the evil of 
excessive partisan gerrymandering. Many believed 
the Supreme Court would finally settle on a standard 
this term. But that was not to be. In Gill v. Whit ford, 
the Court reversed a decision that threw out the en­
tire Wisconsin districting plan as an unconstitutional 
partisan gerrymander. But the justices disposed of the 
case on standing grounds: The Court held that no 
plaintiff had a right to challenge all of the districts, 
only those that affected one’s rights personally, as a 
voter in that district. Benisek v. Lamone was a sec­
ond partisan gerrymandering case disposed of unani­
mously on non-merits grounds. Unlike Gill, this was 
a single district challenge. But because of legal uncer­
tainty about political gerrymandering claims gener­
ally and the poor timing of the plaintiffs’ complaint, 
the Court held that the lower court had not abused 
its discretion in denying relief.
Taken together, Gill and Benisek are best under­
stood as decisions not to decide too much. At one lev­
el, these cases can be understood simply as instances 
of a principle Chief Justice Roberts articulated early 
in his tenure: “If it is not necessary to decide more to 
a case, then in my view it is necessary not to decide 
more to a case.” But there may be deeper signifi­
cance to these cases as well. They may signal that 
the Court is coming to realize, albeit gradually and 
reluctantly, that it should never have led the lower 
courts on this merry chase to micromanage what are 
political decisions. After all, neither the Constitution 
nor the Supreme Court can deliver us from every 
political evil.
W
hat, then, should we expect from 
the post-Kennedy Court? Perhaps 
more of the same. There was not 
a single 5-4  decision this term in 
which Justice Kennedy joined with 
the more liberal wing of the Court. That has never 
before happened on the Roberts Court. And there 
were fourteen 5 -4  cases in which Kennedy joined 
with the four more conservative justices to form a 
majority, including First Amendment cases such as 
Janus and NIFLA,  separation of powers cases like
Trump v. Hawaii, political process cases involving 
political and racial gerrymandering, and a range of 
statutory interpretation and business cases. This re­
cord suggests that, should Judge Brett Kavanaugh be 
confirmed, we ought to expect a fair amount of con­
tinuity rather than radical change.
But in other major areas—areas that happen not 
to have been addressed this term—the change may 
be more substantial. Consider, for example, the con­
stitutional law of abortion. Here, Kennedy’s replace­
ment might make a difference, particularly if there is 
a possibility that a Justice Kavanaugh might join with 
four colleagues in ending the regime of constitutional 
abortion law initiated by Roe v. Wade.
Social conservatives have been disappointed be­
fore. The Court’s first major abortion case after Jus­
tice Kennedy joined the Court was the 1989 decision 
Webster v. Reproductive Health Services, where it 
seemed there might be five votes to overrule Roe. 
Chief Justice William Rehnquist wrote an opinion 
for four justices that purported to “modify and nar­
row” Roe, but Reagan-nominated Justice Sandra 
Day O’Connor went her own way, introducing the 
“undue burden” standard that has remained the law 
until today. Scalia, meanwhile, lamented that this 
missed opportunity to reverse Roe meant that “the 
mansion of constitutional abortion law, constructed 
overnight in Roe, must be disassembled doorjamb 
by doorjamb, and never entirely brought down, no 
matter how wrong it may be.” Scalia was farseeing. 
Four years later, in Planned Parenthood o f South­
eastern Pennsylvania v. Casey, Kennedy joined with 
O’Connor and Justice David Souter to preserve what 
they called “the central holding” of Roe.
We are guardedly optimistic that Kavanaugh’s 
confirmation will eventually result in the rejection of 
Roe v. Wade. But nobody should expect a quick or 
complete demolition of constitutional abortion rights. 
Caution is in order because of both internal Court 
dynamics and external pressure on the institution.
The shift on the new Court should be mea­
sured not by the distance between Kennedy and 
Kavanaugh, but between Kennedy and Roberts. On 
a multi-member Court, the views of the median jus­
tice matter most in the close cases implicating the 
culture wars. And Roberts cares deeply about public 
perceptions of the Court’s legitimacy. The same con­
cerns that motivate Roberts to embrace minimalism 
more broadly, as in the cases this term about parti­
san gerrymandering and sales taxes, will likely mean 
even greater caution in these hotter and angrier areas 
of constitutional law.
Neither should we forget that the result of over­
ruling the Roe/Casey regime is no panacea. It would
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simply lift restrictions on state legislation. But that is 
hardly always desirable. We can surely expect some, 
perhaps many, states to follow the lead of Massa­
chusetts, where legislators passed a NASTY (Negat­
ing Archaic Stereotypes Targeting Young) Women 
Act that repealed abortion restrictions that might in 
theory have come back into force if Roe/Casey were 
overturned. New York’s governor has made exten­
sive abortion rights a rallying cry of his campaign 
for reelection.
Just as the damage done by Roe/Casey is not 
exclusively legal, neither will it be undone by legal 
means alone. The Court and dominant cultural opin­
ion shape each other, and the arrow of influence runs 
in both directions. However much “the mansion of 
constitutional abortion law” may be dismantled, 
the constitutional rot at its foundation is the result 
of powerful cultural forces. Let us not put our trust 
in judges any more than princes, not only because 
they are fallible, but also because judges are meant 
to judge, not to save us from ourselves.
B
eginning in the mid-twentieth century, the 
Court inserted itself into all manner of cul­
tural and social conflicts—about the na­
ture of the human person, sexual mores, 
church-state relations, and many other 
subjects. It purported to resolve cultural disagree­
ment by judicial fiat, and it earned a certain kind of 
prestige for its decisions, channeling the consensus of 
an elite constituency. Over the last two generations, 
America’s cultural, intellectual, and legal leaders 
have become partisans in an increasingly bitter war
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not against foreign enemies, but against large con­
stituencies of Americans, the “deplorables” whose 
religious and moral views have suffered decades of 
sustained assault. What began as a legal war against 
recalcitrant Southern segregationists in the 1950s has 
mutated into something entirely different: a multi­
front campaign to destroy “haters,” who turn out to 
be a significant plurality, and perhaps even a major­
ity, of Americans.
The Supreme Court in recent years has provided 
religious conservatives some respite. This protective 
function is real and important. But by the time these 
culture war cases end up in courts, conservatives 
are usually fighting rearguard actions. As we write, 
Jack Phillips and Masterpiece Cakeshop are back in 
court, trying to stave off yet another attempt by the 
Colorado Civil Rights Commission to use state anti- 
discrimination law to show him, and the nation, who 
is really in charge.
Even if the courts continue to provide all the de­
fensive protection that dissenters seek, and even if 
the courts end the aggressive judicial creation of new 
rights, the war will go on outside the courts. Even 
if the Supreme Court reaffirms that there is no con­
stitutional right to physician-assisted suicide, for ex­
ample, states such as California will persist in their 
commitment to suicide as a fundamental component 
of a perverse view of human dignity and autonomy.
Our cultural conflicts are over the political good, the 
moral good, and most fundamentally, what it means to 
be human. The Supreme Court cannot resolve them. 
True, legal power can provide protection on certain 
fraught battlefields. But the war will go on. 13
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